Introduction
Journalists, politicians, policy makers and academics frequently use figures on the size of the illegal drug industry. This information is undoubtedly important. It is an input in many policy decisions, and influences the way policy makers, citizens and journalists, perceive the illegal industry and its effects on society. However, specific figures can easily be misconstrued because many of those who quote them are unfamiliar with the concepts and methods of statistics and economics that are required for a proper handling and interpretation of data.
Requests for 'just plain facts' are frequent, yet they often emanate from individuals who lack the proper theoretical framework to gauge and analyze them. Data on the size of the illegal drugs industry are used in innumerable ways: they are quoted by journalists to impress the public, by policy makers to request appropriations, by government agencies to measure the success or failure of drug policies, by analysts to identify the beneficiaries of criminal activities and anti drug policies, and even to surmise that international conspiracies are responsible for the perpetuation of ineffective policies, by the peasants' advocates who highlight coca and opium price injustices, etc...
1. The author thanks Tom Blickman, Laura Garcés, Alexandra Guáqueta, Thomas Naylor, Letizia Paoli and Peter Reuter for their comments to an earlier draft and exonerates them from any responsibility.
Most users somehow seek incontestable figures that may be used and exploited, dismissing uncertainties and statistical weaknesses, as well as the figures' conceptual complexities. In practice, almost all those who cite figures neglect first to study the methodologies used, or even to read the studies that produced them.
They insist on 'facts', but do not want to be bothered by the devil in the details. The two quotes at the beginning of this essay by a FARC member and an Ame rican investigative reporter show the conceptual confusion and unrealistic representations of reality frequently found in the literature.
There is a small cadre of serious drug researchers that strive for objectivity and manipulate data carefully but the illegal drug field remains in general deeply flawed. Most people have very strong convictions about mind-altering drugs, and their views on drug policies and the effects of drugs on individuals and societies are conditioned by those convictions. Data on illegal drugs are already difficult to collect and interpret, and the emo tional and ideological charge carried by most data users leads in addition to widespread data misuse. Figures are often quoted to buttress preconceived agendas and personal agendas. Many times, data are quoted without a reference to sources, at others it even appears that figures are spontaneously produced, or invented.
This essay explores a few measurement problems and issues. It surveys and comments on the United Nations estimates on the size of the illegal drug industry.
It documents and discusses a few cases of data abuse and misuse in Colombia, and provides some examples of misuse of economic concepts. It questions finally the importance of accurate estimates, and draws a few conclusions.
Measurement problems and issues
Measuring the illegal drug industry raises innumerable conceptual, technical and political issues. First of all, the obstacles to statistical data collection are daunting. The illegal nature of the industry precludes direct measurement. Researchers have therefore to appeal to, and rely on, satellite photos, peasant interviews, journalistic reports, hospital overdose statistics, police records, and many other largely indirect measures and sources. The estimates available are based on the measuring of several variables. Some look at total illegal revenues, such as the size of the American illegal market or the revenues accruing to the Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian illegal industries.
Estimates can also be made of the revenues and value added at each stage of the business and in each country. Others focus on the direct and indirect employment generated by the illegal industry. Still others measure the size of laundered profits and the ways in which these are laundered. Further assessments can be made on the basis of the value of chemical products used in drug processing that is generated in different countries. Particular attention has also been paid to estimates of the effects of the illegal drug industry on each country, including costs and benefits to the private and public sectors. On the demand side similarly difficult to make estimates are produced about the number of drug users and addicts, the number of working days lost because of drugs, the medical and productivity costs of drug use, etc.
Any estimate of the size of the illegal drugs industry requires that a series of steps be taken, and assumptions drawn at each one of them. These include estimates about coca and poppy acreage, the frequency of coca leaf harvests, the drug content in coca and opium, the quality of the chemicals used and the skills of the chemists employed, the amount of drugs seized, the amount consumed in different markets, drug prices at each stage of the production and marketing chain, etc.
2 The resulting estimate is crucially dependent on those assumptions and the range of possible results is extremely wide.
For example Rocha (1997: 239-243) Some examples illustrate this point. Studies of the costs and benefits generated by the illegal industry produce diverse results depending on the author's position. National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) (1992) estimates of the economic costs of illicit drug consumption, for instance, are based on the concept that all drug consumption is drug abuse. According to this logic, all drug consumption is condemnable, a position which lays all blame, and therefore costs, on drugs. These include the costs of some repressive policies such as incarceration of non-violent minor drug dealers that are very costly, and criminalize large numbers of minority youths. All these costs are attributed only to drugs, implicitly denying that diverse policies generate different distributions of costs and benefits and that those 2. Thoumi, (2003, chap. 5) summarizes these measurement problems.
3. These points are developed in detail in Thoumi (2004) .
should be part of the policy choice criterion. In a similar way, this reading attributes the costs of drug injection HIV transmission solely to drug consump tion, not to policies that prevent the distribution of clean needles and syringes. In this Manichean perspective, all costs are ascribed to the scourge, and no weapon is inappropriate in this struggle against evil.
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Contending positions on illicit drugs are conditioned by strong convictions and beliefs that symbolize and prolong a debate between conflicting visions of the world that are rarely acknowledged or discussed. The illicit drug debate touches at the center of at least three fundamental silent contentions. The first opposes American Puritanism to Latin Ame rican anomie; the second, American Puritanism to European Pragmatism; and the third, within Latin American countries, opposes the 'white' elites to the politically repressed lower classes and ethnic minorities (Thoumi, 2004) . Conflicting nationalist feelings frequently make these silent contentions more complex.
Illegal drug industry's estimates can be elaborated following a reasonable methodology that takes into account the many pitfalls and difficulties inherent in the process. The few academic data users understand the limitations of the figures produced, but most other users are journalists, government officials and politicians that fail to understand those limitations, or simply use the data to promote their own agendas. These data are commonly handled to justify ineffective policies, to claim resources for bureaucracies, as part of exculpatory arguments to justify a country's involvement in the illegal industry, and on a few occasions to do rigorous academic analysis. The following sections illustrate some cases that show how illegal drugs data are wrongly produced and misused.
The United Nations Estimates of the Size of the World Illegal Drug Industry
The United Nations figures published by United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) 5 are a main drug data source in the world. These data are also protected by the technical aura of the UN that is respected by most researchers, journalists and policy makers as reliable, authoritative and objective. The UN is perceived as an organization with a professional staff that produces data that can be used with confidence. Indeed, it is widely known that the UN estimated the annual illegal drug sales in the world at $500 billion (or was it $400 billion?) This figure is frequently used in the Andean countries to highlight the small size of the revenues generated for Colombian, Peruvian and Bolivian coca growers and cocaine traf-4. Interestingly, the Colombian Government has adopted the same methodology (Pérez, Vergara and Lahuerta, 2002) 5. The history of these estima tes is interesting, if very frustrating. Naylor (2002: 33) traces the origin of the $500 billion to the late 1980s: "The $500 billion figure was the result of 'research' attempted by the United Nations agency responsible for coordinating the global assault on drug trafficking -when the boss was desperate for a quick number before a press conference" after which that figure received widespread publicity and put UNDCP in a delicate position since it had to justify it.
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UNDCP does not have enough personnel that can be dedicated to basic research. Its research section is very small: it is led by a well-trained economist who supervises an economist-statistician, two or three other professionals, a couple of assistants and one secretary. It has multiple responsibilities: it keeps a very large world-wide illegal drug data bank; it is required to produce a World Drug Report every two years; it publishes an annual report on 'global illicit drug trends'; it supplies data and other information required by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the International Narcotic Control Board (INCB); it provides inputs to other ODC documents and supplies data for speeches and other public presentations by ODC personnel. Despite the efforts of the committed and hard working group of professionals that make up the research section, it simply does not have the capability to conduct significant critical studies, and to evaluate in detail the quality of the data it collects. Indeed, a large proportion of the section's work is devoted to answering short-term demands. The World Drug Report, the sections' most substantial product, requires the hiring of several consultants who write chapters and sections of the report. After the $500 billion 'estimate' was divulged, the research section revised in more detail the data it had available and concluded that such a number was exag-6. Curiously, the report does not provide any reference to the "many estimates" cited. (Reuter, 1996) . gerated, and could not be used in the 1997 World Drug Report. It is apparent that the original $500 billion figure was too high, and UNDCP had to avoid embarrassment. To avoid potential critics, UNDCP decided to lower it somewhat, and came up with $400 billion. I have questioned several UNDCP members about the procedure that led to this figure, and the best explanation they could offer, was that they surveyed an array of estimates made in different parts of the world and came up with approximately $365 billion, a figure that was rounded up to $400 billion. I just wonder, if they had arrived at $335 billion, would they have rounded it down to $300 billion?
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The lower $400 billion figure is claimed to have been based on another UNDCP (1997b) publication. This is a 60 page study, part of UNDCP technical series, that covers a wide set of issues including drug production, seizures, consumption and the social and economic consequences of drug abuse and trafficking. These include the effects on employment and productivity, determinants of illicit drug prices, effects on balance of payments, on financial systems, on investment and savings, on family and community, health, education, environment, crime, corruption and dangers for civil society. This is certainly not a document arrived at by a serious effort to determine the size of the illegal drug industry, although it does puts together the results of various studies to obtain a figure for the total world turnover of the illegal industry. However, those studies do not follow a common methodology, and have been written by unrelated groups. The result is just a total that includes not only apples and pears but also bananas and an assortment of tropical and temperate zone fruits, an aggregation of incomparable elements.
UNDCP's statement that illicit drug trafficking accounts for eight percent of world international trade is yet more incomprehensible than its $500 or $400 billion figure because it is clearly a comparison between apples and pears. The $400 billion figure is turnover at the retail level, a much higher one than the value of illicit international drug trade. 9 Using the cocaine market as an example, one can say that the wholesale cocaine price ready for export in 'Andinia' is about $1,500
per kilogram. The wholesale import price in the United States is around $15,000 to $18,000 and the retail value sold by the gram can reach $120,000. The question is: which of these figures should be used in the comparison with global international trade? It is obvious that it should be one of the first two, but not the third one used by UNDCP.
If one uses 'Andinia's' export price, the estimate should be about eighty times lower than if one uses the last figure, that is, about 0.1 percent of global trade. If one uses the United States import price, the figure would be about 1 percent of 8. Reuter and Greenfield (2001) argue that UNDCP derived this figure multiplying production estimates times the high United Sates and European retail prices while most opiates are consumed in low-income countries and are sold at lower prices. This might have been the case but during my work at ODCCP in Vienna I did not find evidence of these estimates.
9. The points made in this paragraph are also made by Reuter and Greenfield (2001) .
global trade. Apparently, none of these two estimates were satisfactory to UNDCP, perhaps because they did not show that illicit drug trade represented a large share of global international trade. Furthermore, any serious estimate should study the difference between wholesale export and import prices that is about 1,000 percent, compared to about 5 percent in licit trade. The actual trade routes are another interesting difference between licit and illicit trade. Legal trade normally flows directly from producer to user country. Illegal trade frequently goes through several transit places that charge a 'passing through tax' before reaching the final destination. The nature of transportation costs in illegal goods is very different from those in the legal sector.
It is also worth noting that by 1999 UNDCP had not attempted to follow up its efforts to estimate the size of the world illegal drug market. That year, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) decided to begin work to assess the size of the world illegal economy and fount it convenient to start with an estimate of the illegal drug market, a task that was considered easier than estimating other illegal activities, given the large work on drugs already available. FATF hired Peter
Reuter, a well-known economist who has done extensive work on illegal drug markets and produced an estimate. This job had the full cooperation of the UNDCP that opened its data bank to the researcher.
The resulting study is probably the most serious attempt to ascertain the size of the world illegal drug market, and resulted in an estimated range between $45 and $280 billion. Unfortunately, after an internal debate in the FATF it was decided not to publish the study because some country members expected a larger figure. 10 The wide range of the estimates reflect the diversity in possible assumptions required at several stages in the production, smuggling and marketing chain.
Some cases of data abuse and misuse in Colombia
Many of the most popular opinion makers and most important intellectuals of the country use illegal drugs data to absolve the country's involvement in the illegal trade and to place on foreigners the responsibility for that participation. Data are used to 'prove' that the United States promoted ineffective anti drug policies beause of the benefits that that country derives from the illegal industry: " 14. Illegal drug data are also used by Colombian guerrillas to show their own importance. (Ríos, 2000: 154) . These figures exaggerate the importance of illegal drugs in the world economy and the relevance of FARC as a principle political force controlling an important cocaine source.
For example, FARC argues that "drug trafficking moves 20 to 30 percent of the world economy and drug trade value exceeds oil and it is only exceeded by that of weapons"
States would not maintain prohibitionist and punitive policies if they were not a good business. However, a simple national accounts analysis shows the opposite.
In basic Economics texts, it is shown that Y=C+I+G+X -M. A proposition that spelled out means that the total aggregate demand in a country is equal to the sum of expenditures in consumption, investment, government and exports minus imports. American prohibitionist policies increase the value of imports (M) and lowers income (Y). Those policies increase Colombian exports (X) and increase Colombian income. In other words, have the opposite effect to that asserted.
It is important to point out that this analysis is based on accounting. Some may argue that the categories Y, C, I, G, X and M are ideologically biased. Theories and models that use these are certainly influenced by ideologies, but their specific use in accounting is not. For instance, data counting males, females, gays, people that are tall, short, fat, thin, Caucasian, Black, etc., can be used in a variety of ways, but it is not possible to argue that simply counting them is ideologically motivated.
Another frequent argument upholds that the 'great profits from drug trafficking remain in the United States', which implicitly indicates an unjust distribution of illegal drug profits. Statements of this nature suggest that drug addicts are a natural resource to be exploited, and that drug trafficking profits are a net increase in a country's income. However, when an addict consumes drugs, he/she lowers his or her consumption of legal goods and services, and when addiction causes him or her to stop working, he/she becomes a burden on society. In a best-case scenario, illicit drug expenditures are transferred from the legal to the illegal sector, and in the worst one they generate a decline in income for the country.
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There is no doubt that in the illegal industry profits account for a much larger share of value added than in the legal one. This higher share represents the remuneration to risk. However, it is not possible to argue from this that the American economy benefits from the illicit drugs industry.
It is also worth mentioning that a comparison between illegal drugs and legal agricultural commodities shows that the main differences in the cost increases along the production, international trade and marketing chain are found in the international trade stage. For legal commo dities the difference between the ex-15. In his comments to this paper Professor Naylor suggested that prohibitionist policies in the United States may raise aggregate demand if drug users lower their savings to purchase drugs by an amount that exceeds the increase in the value of imports. This is a theoretical possibility that ideally could empirically be tested. Unfortunately, given the illegal nature of the drug market it is not possible to obtain good data to test that hypothesis. However, considering that most users are young and unlikely to save, that addicts tend to lose earning power and that the savings rate in the United States has been at remarkably low levels for at least the last ten years, one can safely state that the scenario raised by Professor Naylor is very unlikely to occur. port and the import price is almost always less than 10% of the export price and frequently much lower. In the case of cocaine and heroin the difference is about 1,000% (Reuter and Greenfield, 2002) . The difference between import and retail prices is in absolute terms also much greater for illegal drugs but it tends to be proportional to that of legal commo dities. In other words drug and other agricultural commodities retail prices are approxima tely the same percentage of import prices in the United States and Western Europe.
If it were true that the illegal industry contributed to economic growth in the United States, we would be confronting a very innovative theory of economic development through illegality. Following this theory, one would recommend that Colombia declare tobacco illegal to increase cigarette prices and smuggling that would then generate "large profits that would remain in Colombia and increase the country's national income".
Some examples of misuse of economic concepts
The National Planning Department of Colombia has produced estimates of the economic costs generated by the illegal drugs 'problem' in Colombia (Pérez, Vergara and Lahuerta 2002) . This work follows the methodology used by the NIDA (1992, chap. 3) that classifies as a 'cost' all government and private expenditures that one way or another can be associated to the illegal drug industry. These 'costs' include some effects of anti-drug policies, price increases caused by the illegal drug boom, and social investment in education mandated by the constitution. This approach appears designed to maximize the 'costs' generated by the 'drug problem' in Colombia and has profound conceptual deficiencies.
First, it conceives the illegal industry as an exogenous scourge that befell in Colombia through accident or bad luck, while Government policies, social institutions, history and other factors played no role in the development of the illegal industry. In this perspective, the illegal drugs industry is the root cause of the country's problems.
Second, investments in alternative development programs, physical and social infrastructure in illegal crop areas including education and health projects, and expenditures in conflict resolution systems and the strengthening the judiciary system are 'costs' attributed to the illegal industry. In other words, if it weren't for the illegal drug industry, the government would not spend any money in those regions and thus, those expenditures are 'costs' due to the drug industry even though all those expenditures are required by the country's constitution.
Third, some indirect effects such as the increase in AIDS associated to intravenous drug injections are attributed wholly to the existence of illegal drug demand without taking into account the fact that the government refuses to allow distribution of clean needles and syringes to addicts. Since this is wholly perceived as a 'holy war', the government cannot use 'immo ral' harm reduction policies that would be tantamount to collaborating with the devil. If policies generate costs, these are attributed to drugs because repressive polices are considered necessary to combat immorality.
Fourth, some economic effects of the illegal drug industry development are classified as 'costs' even when they are not. For example, price increases in non-tradeable goods and services in areas booming because of the illegal industry, are termed 'costs'. In other words, salary increases that benefit workers and are generated by an employment boom in coca growing areas are classified as 'costs'. Finally, all these 'costs' are added up and yield a great sum.
The justification provided by the National Planning Department to produce this estima te is simply that the methodology used is 'international', which means that it is used by a superior authority, in this case NIDA, which is clearly biased. By appealing to this authority, the authors are exempted from discussing in detail the nature of the effects of the illegal drug industry, to justify why every expense is a 'cost', to separate the real social costs generated by the illegal drug industry from the costs caused by various policies, and to acknowledge that the illegal drug industry does generate some economic benefits. It remains to be ascertained whether such authors realize that by using this 'international methodology', they are implicitly accepting a 'war on drugs' approach to deal with illegal drugs in Colombia.
How important are the estimates? Is it Important to have accurate estimates?
The need for quality and the importance of estimates about illicit drugs depend on how they are used. As noted above, these estimates are often voluntarily or involuntarily misinterpreted and misused. In most occasions, those who appeal to 'facts' regarding drugs, lack a defined rigorous model to process the data and produce a serious analysis.
'Drug facts' are frequently used to underscore how important the problem is; to argue that a particular country or social group benefits unfairly from illegal trade; that a particular country's economy depends on illegal drugs' revenues; that a financial sector is also dependent on illegal drug deposits; that particular organizations require larger budgets; that some countries need and are deserving of greater international cooperation; and on occasions to argue that total drug income in a particular country is relatively small. All these and many other uses of the illegal drug data are highly biased and politically motivated, and consequently do not require accurate data. Indeed, many benefit from inaccurate and exaggerated figures. Such approaches would alter and interpret the data for their convenience. Reuter (1996) has argued forcefully that data on the illegal drug industry data have been "decorative" and has not been taken into consideration in policy formu-lation. The lack of policy relevance of these data translates in the lack of real incentives to produce accurate data. This is another reason for the poor quality of the data and the lack of concern among many of those charged with data production.
It may be argued that accurate estimates are needed for rigorous studies of the effects of the illicit drug industry on a country. However, the evidence regarding the effects of the industry on several countries shows the complexity of the process by which effects develop, and especially that those effects are not directly related to the size of the current illegal activity. For instance, all estimates from the Andean countries show that from the late 1970s to the late 1990s the share of GDP generated by illegal drugs in Bolivia and Peru was substantially larger than in Colombia. Furthermore, in the three countries that share declined through time and b y the late 1990s it was significantly lower than 20 years earlier (Thoumi, 2003, chap. 5) .
Despite those data, there is a consensus on the fact that this industry's repercussions on Colombia have been much greater than in the other two countries, and that its current effects on Colombia are much greater and negative than in the past. There is also a consensus on the point that the nature of the effects has evolved through time. Indeed, it may be argued that the effects crucially depend on the structure and institutions of each country, on the policies followed, and that the dynamics of positive and negative effects are very different. Positive effects appear to be short lasting while negative effects are cumulative and become aggravated in the long run. For example, during the 1970s and 1980s the illegal drug industry generated real estate and contraband booms in Colombia that most citizens perceived as positive. By the late 1990s the industry was clearly funding the Colombian 'ambiguous war' and its economic effects were clearly negative.
This evidence shows that accurate estimates are less important than what many might think. The illegal drug trade has been 'large' in those three countries, but what has been important is not merely the size of the trade, but its ability to alter social behaviors, increase corruption and crime and fund insurgent and counter insurgent guerrillas. The size of the illegal drug industry is not particularly relevant as a 'cause' of these social developments. For instance, the drug industry funding of Colombian politicians in 1994 amounted to no more than one percent of the conservative industry's annual profit estimates and yet, this forced Ernesto Samper, the elected president, to govern in the midst of a continual four year political crisis (Thoumi, 2003) .
Large estimates are used to argue that the illegal industry is the 'cause' of many social ills. The evidence from the Andes indicates that in regards to illegal drugs, traditional causality is not relevant, but rather, it is necessary to focus on the process which brought the illegal industry to that region, which concentrated trafficking in Colombia, allowed the development of large coca fields, prevents the law enforcement agencies from achieving long-lasting success, etc.
As argued in the last section, the importance of having 'hard' numbers is greatly exaggerated because most uses are political and biased in nature and because most users do not have a formal model in which to apply the data. Furthermore, given the role of illicit drugs as a catalyst that accelerate social processes already in progress, the influence of illegal drugs on society do depend on the size of the illegal industry but also on the structure, institutions and values of the society and on the history of past drug income, anti-drug policies and the changes in institutions and values that had occurred. Thus, in a country like Colombia, the illegal drugs' industry is today smaller than twenty years ago but its role in Colombian society today is a lot more negative than in previous decades.
Finally, the moral of the story is just that it would be nice to have accurate data on the illegal drugs industry, but it would be a lot nicer if the data are used with scientific rigor, acknowledging their limitations and avoiding political biases. 
TNI Crime & Globalisation Project
The Crime & Globalisation project will look at the impact of the activities of criminal networks on the global economic system, particularly the international financial system, and at links between the co nsequences of the "migration into ille gality", good governance, failed states, civil conflicts. This will also include looking at the nature and impact of international and multilateral policy initiatives in this regard, with particular reference to, 
